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
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
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STUDENT ESSAY

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EFFECTS AND COUNTER EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC POLICIES WITH THE THIRD WORLD--A SOUTH ASIAN VIEW

BY

C. A. M. N. SILVA
COLONEL

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
EFFECTS AND COUNTER EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN
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WORLD--A SOUTH ASIAN VIEW

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Colonel C. A. M. N. Silva

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This essay consists of an outline of the factors existing in the major South Asian countries. These factors are analyzed against existing policy objectives and strategies of the US and the USSR and in the process of which suggestions to and criticism of the existing strategies are made. The main purpose of the essay is to examine all aspects as seen from an Asian viewpoint and the essay sequence and paragraphing has been structured to emphasize relevant and important aspects of these strategies.

SEQUENCE OF SUBJECTS

Introduction - Motivation

National Policy - National Security

The Threat in South Asia

Early Soviet Strategy outline

Third World - South Asia, general inherent factors, mistakes in policy - Vietnam.

Soviet Strategy in South Asia

- A prerequisite description of Regional factors
- Conclusions on Regional factors
- Detailed description

Leading Asian States

Soviet Strategy - Continuation

Nonaligned Countries

United States Strategy - concepts and suggestions

- Soviet Strategy, advantages and disadvantages
- US Strategy and comments
- Military capability
- Influence other than military capability
- Economic Strategy
- Other influences

Summary

- Soviet Strategy for South Asia
- US Strategy for South Asia

Introduction

The effects of United States strategy in the Third World and the reaction of Third World countries depend on factors, of which many would originate in the conditions and the environments of the respective Third World countries. Some of these factors may have considerable influence but may not receive the attention they deserve if the conditions and environments themselves are not known or understood. Therefore, before working out a strategy for an area, a regional survey and analysis of each country is an essential prerequisite. A survey and analysis not only from a US point of view but also as seen from the conditions and environments of Third World countries. That is it could be described as a scene (the strategy), faced with two windows, placed at different directions and the participants should look from both windows on the same scene if an accurate survey and analysis is to be made. It is on this basis that this essay is written. It looks upon US strategy and its effects as a South Asian view. The essay does not limit itself to a mere description of US strategy. Strategy is only described in extracts and in outline only as far as it is required to illustrate the effects of this strategy and to highlight criticism. It is similarly necessary to describe Soviet and Asian communist strategy. I have further given myself the interesting task of going beyond description and criticism into making suggestions as seen by a South Asian for US strategy and to forecast the possible avenues that Soviet strategy for South Asia may take.

The essay has to commence with at least a broad outline as to what is US policy. Here again my attempt is to avoid repetition of known facts and

orthodox approaches, and I have allowed myself the interesting task of what I believe should be US policy objectives and strategies. In this process it is, however, inevitable that there will be deviation and disagreement on some aspects of accepted facts whilst there will be repetition and coincidence on others. I believe that if a logical reasoning were to result in considerable deviations and disagreements, this may not only cause more interest but will widen the chances of some useful fact emerging.

In its broadest meaning, national policy can be defined as the ensuring of national security. Immediately then follows the question, "What then is national security?" Basically the national security of a nation would be:

- a. Protection of the land and people from invasion.
- b. Prevent in any form interference that will adversely affect the essential requisites for living.

The objectives for paragraph A are straightforward and will coincide at least in its broad aspects for both a small nation and a world power, i.e., the physical protection of its own territory limited to its own national boundaries. In the case of a nation thrust into the position of a World Power, the responsibilities go beyond safeguarding its own people and land within the perimeter of its national boundaries. The security limits of its land and people are linked by many avenues of vital political and economical interests branching out and going beyond the physical natural boundaries into many parts of the globe. The very structure and size of its economy links it to the economies of other nations whose resources and market potential is essential to maintain the turnover of its economy. National policy has to cater, therefore, to a new dimension--multinational corporation. Political alliances and trade agreements are the direct results. The increase in global responsibilities creates the necessity to

feed and secure an increasing industrial turnover, i.e., on which it has to depend to meet its international commitments. To maintain this industrial turnover, it has to again depend on external resources and markets, i.e., a vicious circle.

The entry of another World Power brings in competition--a rival. Rivalry develops or can develop into a threat.

The Threat

In the preceding paragraphs the words security, threat, protect, have occurred. The need for security and protection, the form and degree they have to take is dependent on the existence, the form and the degree of the threat itself. What is the threat? What is its origin and form? It is essential that all its ingredients should be understood in detail in order to analyze and in turn understand the effects and counter effects of the other factors. The threat originates from the political drive of Communism itself that Communism should be expanded into every country. This immediately means imposing a different way of life as the requirements of the Communist economical and social ideologies differ basically from those of Democratic Societies and the Communist Political Drive does not accept co-existence with other economical ideologies. The USSR has made itself responsible to be the executor of this policy with many nations opposed to the Communist way of life polarizing around the US. This refusal of many countries, with varying societies and cultures to accept the Communist form of government and its economical structure has produced the friction that has brought out the threat. The threat to the US in the South Asian Region will be the denial of facilities of strategic value and economic strangulation by disruption of the arteries linking the US economy to that of the economies of countries in this region; essential arteries that ensures the

input/output of vital resources, raw material and commodities. The differences in these countries or in regions have channelled the threat to take different forms of strategy to cater to these differences. Generally the threat can materialize either in a military form or as a gradual process of anti-western influence or a combination and coordination of both methods. These forms have to be accurately analyzed into recognizable and tangible forms, if they are to be effectively countered. It would now be proper to examine the actual steps taken so far by the Soviets in pursuing this doctrine of World Communism to identify its form and direction and to what degree it has been successful.

The situation at the end of the Second World War could be described as follows.

a. The western nations of Europe were in a state of social and economical disorder and instability but with the military capabilities of USSR and the US and the western allies intact.

b. The awareness of the Communist strategy of world Communism and the immediate danger of the USSR exploiting the state of disorder in Europe to occupy as many nations as possible.

c. In the Third World an upsurge of awareness and activating of independence movements amongst the colonized nations.

In the European theatre the Soviet method was direct military occupation or intervention and resulted in the formation of the Warsaw Pact countries whilst other European nations polarized themselves around the US to form NATO and its allies.

In the Third World, however, everything was not so straightforward. The presence of colonial powers presented a different aspect. It was only China and North Korea that became Communist i.e., two countries that had

freed themselves of foreign domination. Local Communist Armies were already in existence. I have left out Vietnam at this stage because Vietnam is an important example to be considered against the analysis in the following paragraphs. Many of the factors influencing both policy objectives and strategies to be adopted today either originated or developed during the years or two decades after World War II.

The Third World--many nations with a vast source of raw materials and resources and a market for finished products was controlled by a few European nations. At the end of World War II these colonized nations received what they lacked earlier--military capability in the form of guerilla war--the ability to fight back against superior military capability. These western nations with the exception of Britain in their attempt to retain their colonies failed to recognize reality and made mistakes, which together with existing circumstances were exploited to a maximum by the Communist parties to spread their influence.

a. One mistake was the failure to realize that these Asian people were not separate Nomadic Tribes but ancient races with separate nationalities and deep rooted distinct cultures and have fought for centuries as nations.

b. They failed to realize that a deep awareness had arisen and that having prevented the Japanese from militarily colonizing these nations, they could not themselves hope to colonize by military force as they did in the 16th and 17th centuries. Also that military capabilities of these nations could be supplemented continuously by another power, with the ulterior motive of forming a satellite.

c. To these actors were added the unfortunate circumstances that all colonizing powers were western nations. To this was added the contributory mistake made by western nations that all nationalist movements were Communist.

They failed to realize that the majority were not Communist, but all organizations and groups within each nation including Communists joined to get rid of foreign domination. This was the final objective to all nationalists except the Communist, to whom this was only phase I of a campaign the final phase being to establish a Communist state. Every organization fighting for independence was branded as Communist and this was exploited to a maximum by the Communist powers especially in countries where fighting broke out and military assistance was only from these Communist powers.

It would now be appropriate to examine the question would Vietnam have become an independent and a democratic state or at least achieved a milder form of socialist government, if the French and the US adopted different strategies? I do not think a definite answer could be given but the French mistakes definitely assisted the Vietnamese Communist Party. In studying French mistakes, the lesson to be learnt for today's policymaking is that, today's influences on policy is the cumulative effects of such mistakes or correct decisions made over a period of years. As an example the French mistakes were as follows:

a. The French authorities refused to listen to Ho Chi Minh in the early 1920s and compelled him to seek and make use of the only avenue left--Moscow. Moscow was not slow in seizing this chance. In contrast to the French Britain at the same period not only entertained these requests by the colonies but sent commissions to inquire into them. A wise and shrewd decision because it prevented frustration and turning to other sources for assistance.

b. The French were trapped by Ho Chi Minh to eliminate nationalist non-Communist organizations and leaders and left Vietnam with no other

leadership other than Communist. There was no significant organization around which the people could oppose the Communist party.

c. Over the years, before and after World War II, French behavior had destroyed a favorable image of French authority. Again a factor easily exploited against all Western authorities.

Soviet Strategy had to differ in the Third World of Asia. Direct military intervention was not possible, as it could become a complicated and dangerous process and above all not necessary because there were alternative means through assistance to local militant Communist movements. The result today is North Korea and Vietnam as completed projects. By the time these were completed, the 1970 years had seen many changes in Asia calling for changes in strategy. A prerequisite to understanding and studying strategy for the 1980s would, therefore, be an examination of the main countries of this region. In each of the following paragraphs, there will be found the factors whose aggregate influence should determine the strategy to be used by either power.

a. In general, by the 1970s these Asian nations had gained considerable experience in the spheres of economical requirements. The economical objective being economical independence or self-sufficiency. These countries found this objective a formidable one to achieve. They realized that they had to develop and become economically independent or deteriorate or slip back into a far more worse position than being colonized or politically subjugated i.e., economical dependency on a foreign power. Therefore, they were and are still desperate and determined to obtain from any available source those factors vital for economical self-sufficiency. Capital--technical knowledge etc. What then, one might ask is the difficulty or desperation

in obtaining these factors when it could be done by joining a larger or prosperous nation. The answer lies in paragraph b.

b. These Asian countries, as described earlier are mostly ancient races with distinct deep rooted cultures, traditions and religions of their own. These had been for two to four centuries subjugated and suppressed by foreign domination, and had remained dormant but not destroyed. In almost every case it was these cultures and religions that, during these centuries of foreign domination, spurred on and maintained the demand for independence. After independence, these cultures and religions blossomed forth, influencing and very often dominating the way of life. Their long period of subjugation enhanced their values from which emerged a sharpened and determined attitude i.e., that this way of life will not be changed or subjugated.

c. We can now come to certain conclusions which will influence policy-making. These conclusions are the logical result of the conditions described in paragraphs a and b.

1. If the way of life--which includes the economical, cultural and religious ideologies--is similar to or is not contradictory to the way of life of any other country then there is a firm foundation for communication and an understanding to develop, especially to mutually prevent any interference of this common or similar way of life.

2. The only occasion when this way of life is risked is when there is a dire, critical economical situation and that country turns to any direction for aid.

3. When a country, placed in such a critical economical condition turns for assistance to a larger nation, it does not necessarily mean that a bond, communication or the way of life of that second country has been accepted. However, the instability brought about by economical distress

makes such a country fertile for influence that will deliberately corrode the indigenous way of life.

4. The difficult task of gradual economical development through aid will prevent economical disintegration described in sub-paragraph 2.

5. Economical development through assistance is still possible even after a country has turned towards a rival country for assistance, as long as the way of life remains unchanged and is as described in sub-paragraph 1.

These conclusions based on the facts of sub-paragraphs a and b have been evolved because of one dominating fact. These countries had developed or achieved a political maturity by the 1970s, a "mind of their own" towards international politics. Contained within this maturity is a sensitiveness to foreign influence--a sensitiveness arising from centuries of foreign domination.

The description in paragraph b of a "way of life" was an outline and and sufficient for the purpose of impressing or conveying to the reader the attitude of these Asian countries. However, if the strategies are to be adopted and if the reaction from these countries is to be understood, then a further description would be necessary. The description fits almost every South Asian country and, therefore, their reactions would be similar. Any differences would be brought out in the description of individual countries.

The races occupying these countries have never been nomadic. For centuries their economy had been an agricultural one and the social system had almost always been feudal and monarchical. This state of permanency enabled, over the centuries, for distinct traditions and patterns of behavior to evolve and take root. The agricultural economy demanded the coordination of effort, the organization and maintenance of resources, such as systems of irrigation, for the benefit of everyone and not merely for a

small group. Necessity for such coordinated effort and permanency in their respective areas made these people identify themselves as distinct races and not nomadic tribes i.e., and identifying of these races as a nation. For example, the Singhalese of Sri Lanka are over 2,500 years old. Sri Lanka again for over 2,500 years has been recorded in Asian history as Lanka, the land of the Singhalese. Nationality, therefore, is an easily indentifiable, deeply rooted concept whose values have been enhanced by subjugation to colonial rule.

These Asian races apart from economical necessity were bound together by religion. Again because of the permanency of their occupation, religion developed and finally dominated every aspect of their lives. Religion in fact dominated and influenced every institution of society including the monarchy. Religion was the rallying and driving force during times of foreign invasions and during periods of foreign domination. Systematic and intense persecution and denial of privileges failed to uproot the influence of religion and the political influence of the clergy and today, years after independence, once again religion exercises a dominating influence.

Another factor not to be underestimated is that of family traditions. Family traditions go beyond very close associations with the inner family group to an outer circle and often extending association to a village or town. Many personal names carry the name of town or village of ancestry.

All these factors, combine and form an aggregate requirement or demand by the whole society or population as essential for their way of life. To this is added the necessity for economic stability. It is only in conditions of economic crisis that the essential factors of the way of life will become submerged. It is at this point that a particular society becomes vulnerable to accept influence alien to their way of life. Therefore, the

attempt would be by an interested foreign power to promote economic instability first--bring about and submerge sensitiveness of a nation to its way of life--gain economical or political control and then attempt to finally disintegrate the factors upholding that way of life. This last part--the disintegration of the factors of a way of life is extremely difficult. For purposes of strategy making it is essential to remember that this way of life of a nation may become submerged, will become dormant but not dead. The final expression or voice is that of a society. A Communist government does not necessarily mean a Communist people. After the economic crisis is over, those factors emerge once again to throw off or at least resist anything foreign to its way of life. Today most of these Asian nations have recognized that the western approach has no desire to change their way of life. Private enterprise and incentive and freedom of choice for the individual are common factors, to these Asian people who for centuries treasured freedom of worship, family ties and whose individual citizens after long periods of colonization are eager individually to have and possess material benefits. They believe and desire material differences with equal opportunity for all to achieve it together with the freedom of choice to do so. The Soviet strategy of influence have recognized most of these factors and have commenced to corrode them over the years through influence at root level, i.e., the steady approach to influence individuals and small groups within a nation, small groups at the minimum economic level. The individual desire for material progress is camouflaged through propaganda and amalgamated to form two classes of society the materially lower against the higher. This influence can develop only if there is economic instability. Therefore, for the Soviet policy objective of establishing a communist government to be achieved other than by military means, the economic stability of a country has to be prevented or even disrupted. Economic

improvement can only be allowed after a communist authority is established. Improving the economy of a non-communist country therefore is undertaken at a minimum purely to maintain a friendly relationship.

It will now be appropriate to describe the larger countries.

Japan has expanded into a developed country with considerable technical skill and economic capability as to become an economical power in Asia. Two factors predominate any reaction by Asian nations to a strategy adopted towards Japan.

a. Japan's economic growth together with her close association with the US has a favorable impression. This combination creates the possibility of an effective barrier to Communist advancement. In the minds of Asians this is a very effective association especially if it is extended and developed with South Korea.

b. Japanese militarism of World War II has not been forgotten. Asian nations have not forgotten that Japanese militarism found expression mainly because of the necessity for an economical drive, the drive to control the resources and markets of other Asian countries. This same economical necessity can occur to feed Japan's huge industrial machine. Therefore, whilst Japanese power in association with the US will be looked upon favorably Japan taking an independent and major role in Asian affairs, especially security aspects will be viewed with considerable apprehension as more responsibility would call for increased military capability. Further it may be viewed as a sign of the withdrawal of US interest and willingness to participate in Asian matters. The presence of the US in alliance with Japan and South Korea can be a highly influential factor for other Asian organizations to prepare for closer alliance with this group, whilst the withdrawal of the US will have the opposite effect of these countries attempting

to safeguard themselves against a possible future breach of security. The withdrawal of the US even partially will cause a vacuum. Into this vacuum, leading Asian countries, making use of the doubts of increasing Japanese powers, will attempt to come in to form associations and alliances. The result may be two or three groups of nations, out of which even one or at least one can provide an avenue for a Communist influence or power group to form.

South Korea

South Korea like Japan shows a success project, in the eyes of Asian countries for the US. The South Korean advance in their economy will have an increasing influence on Asian countries as the North Korean economy gradually deteriorates. Its deterioration may be slowed down by assistance from Communist powers but it will gradually take place. To bring in a reason to show the world as the cause of deterioration, North Korea will try its best to provoke South Korea into a war. South Korean authorities themselves may happily enter into a war with North Korea, with the purpose of unifying Korea, but there can be only adverse effects because--

a. The Chinese and Soviets will not allow a major Communist state to be completely defeated, as apart from being a setback to Communist expansion, it will create a very adverse effect to the image of Communist power in Asia. It will indicate the inability of the Soviets and the Chinese to effectively assist another Communist state.

b. North Korea is now recognized as a separate state and the South Korean attempt will be accepted by some countries at least, as an invasion, and will be used to smear the name of the US.

c. South Korea though militarily strong cannot hope to defeat an enormous and well trained North Korean Army by a short war, specially with

assistance being given to North Korea by the Soviets and the Chinese. The US may, therefore, once again become involved at least in supporting a very expensive war. The Soviets without committing their own troops will happily watch this, and hoping that the US will get further involved i.e., with combatant ground troops. If this were to take place the chances of escalation will indeed be very considerable, with the Communist powers determined to prevent the defeat of North Korea whilst the US could not possibly face another withdrawal from an Asian war without achieving its objective.

The strategy, therefore, should be to guarantee the security of South Korea, consolidate and develop its economy and allow the steady deterioration of the North Korean economy. Military action should be only to punish severely any North Korean move into South Korea.

North Korea today faces a deteriorating economy. Its vast Army is well beyond the requirements for national defense and is in fact a chief source of employment propping up the economy. North Korean moves can, therefore, take the dangerous avenues of having to employ this Army in some military adventure, which will also assist in covering up and drawing attention from the weaknesses or failure of the Communist economical ideology in North Korea. The North Korean people come under the influence of the way of life described earlier. These factors, however, would be submerged by the Communist influence, but can emerge as the economy deteriorates and hardship in living conditions appear. Every effort should be made to increase dissatisfaction and unrest amongst the people of North Korea, especially by drawing attention to the developing economy of South Korea.

China

The combination of the North Korean, Vietnamese and the Chinese armies provides a formidable mass of manpower in Asia. Today this catastrophe is prevented by China. Soviet-Chinese rivalry for leadership of world Communism and Vietnamese attempts at leadership of Asian Communism has brought China into a position where friendship with the West is a possibility. Again economic deterioration and the desire to modernize industries with western technology are strong contributory causes. The move of the North Korean Armies across into Asia can only be prevented or made possible by China. The tempting lure of economical development may change or at least curb Chinese assistance to Communist expansionism in Asia and gain vital time for countries desperately trying to stabilize and put their economical house in order.

Vietnam today like North Korea maintains a massive army beyond the requirements for national security. Like North Korea, the army is the largest source of employment and cannot be kept idle. Vietnam is better placed geographically to use its armies for expansion, which it has already done. Vietnam provides and is an example of Soviet expansion through an Asian Communist state, and without getting involved themselves. Today this appears to be the main threat. The fall of Campuchea and Laos can mean the influence of and subsequent fall of Burma. This highlights, therefore, what could possibly be Soviet strategy.

Assessed Soviet Strategy - Continuation

A summary of Soviet strategy in Asia is now appropriate before proceeding to describe the remaining Asian countries as these countries provide the foundation for an answer to Communist expansionist strategy.

The Soviet policy objective of a Communist dominated Asia has not been achieved. The two main strategies used are as follows.

a. The military occupation by Asian Communist Parties has only been successful in the few Communist states in existence today. Here too, Soviet leadership has been thwarted by the independent attitudes taken by China, North Korea and Vietnam.

b. The second, strategy of encouraging Communist insurgencies in Democratic Regimes have again not been completely successful and in some instances have failed. The main cause for failure being the reaction by these countries to change, i.e., to the practice of Communist ideologies.

As far back as 1969, the Soviet strategy objective was the establishment of a collective security system for Asia. The failure or partial failure of the two methods or strategies mentioned does not necessarily mean the abandonment of this policy objective of Communist domination of Asia, but it means a change in strategy taking into account all current factors and current or changed situations. What then are the changes in strategy as from a western view. What direction will the threat take. As I see it, I have described it below in point, form, attempting at the same time to keep it to some logical sequence of action.

a. In South Asia, the Soviets will not confront the US directly, i.e., militarily because firstly of the risk of prohibitive losses, and secondly, because there is also alternative methods of achieving their objectives.

b. Flowing from paragraph a, the Soviets will also avoid and prevent large scale direct attacks on countries that have agreements or alliances with the US, such as Thailand--Japan--South Korea.

c. The Soviet aim, therefore, will be at those countries which have not yet gone Communist, which have no alliances with the US. Out of this group they will first concentrate on those countries which have very weak economies and are unstable. What is the center of gravity at which they will aim? The center of gravity will be the determination of the respective nations to preserve their way of life, all of which runs counter to the practice of Communist ideology. The method they will use is to create any type of disturbance to lower economic stability to a condition of crisis or desperation and then pour in satellite Communist troops. Cambodia is a good example. Under these conditions, the determination to resist a change is submerged to necessity. This process is slow, tedious and difficult, but to the Communists, perseverance and patience is a developed second nature.

d. Dominated countries will be used to surround and influence countries not yet dominated, such as Thailand and Burma. The gravity of the situation may be gauged if a future scenario for Thailand is considered. Thailand surrounded by Communist or Communist dominated states will be continuously and deliberately confronted with internal and border disturbances, with the primary aim of ruining her economy, i.e., a continuous running ulcer on her economy which will also sap and weaken her society psychologically. The objective for a country such as Thailand where the immediate aim may not be to establish a Communist state, but compulsion to cease or decrease links and association with the US in return for peace and non-interference internally and on her borders. Establishing a Communist government will come later. If this first phase is achieved, a very impressive advance would have been made and it would have a considerable effect on other Asian countries. The next stage could be Malaysia.

e. Afghanistan is given a separate sub-paragraph to point out a very practical possibility. After a few years of fighting, if rebel activity is not controlled, Soviet military effort may be turned into a different strategy. Again, since a cooperating government is in power, the Soviets can offer to the rebels non-interference in all areas and local institutions and their way of life in return for unhindered access for military movement across Afghanistan to the borders and if possible, base facilities. In the alternative a continuation of the war not with Soviets troops but primarily with hordes of Asian troops pouring into the towns and villages of Afghanistan, Asian troops, such as the North Vietnamese, prepared to remain for years away from Vietnam, well trained and well equipped guerilla fighters with no serious logistic problems. Inundation by numbers alone may prove to be the deciding factor for the rebels to accept terms. The prospect of fighting other Asian guerillas capable of coming into their mountain strongholds and villages will be an entirely different turn of events to fighting Soviet troops.

The next stage--Pakistan. With Soviet troops massed on her borders, and pressurized by a similar pattern of influence, threats and an offer of peace, will Pakistan cool off relations with US? It is possible.

f. These moves described, may seem not very practical if considered as taking place in a short time, but it should be borne in mind that they will take place after steady and gradual preparation over a period of time. At every stage, it will be ensured that there will be no conditions for the US to intervene directly. The world diplomatic stage will be so prepared, that the use of military power by the US will raise a storm of protest that a super power is entering a conflict in the Third World. Doubts and fears will drive these protests as the Soviets will threaten to intervene themselves if the US enters and thereby escalate a regional problem.

g. Simultaneous military action through satellite armies. After the preparation of Third World countries in Asia, upto a stage where quick military action is possible and feasible military action in other areas of the world can be commenced in order to draw attention away from South Asia, to dissipate or spread out the military capability of the western powers. It may even be possible in such areas themselves, to achieve their objectives as the situation may be ready for military action to finally establish Communist Regimes, such a scenario of simultaneous military action could be as follows.

1. Sudden sweep of Vietnamese plus other satellite troops into Laos, Campuchea, Burma.

2. Cuban and Nicaraguan troops move into El Salvador.

3. Under cover of a prepared effort with two or three black African states, Cuban troops with or without Vietnamese/Korean troops move into South Africa. Whether these moves take place or not the Soviets have developed an outstanding advantage in the form of enormous numbers of satellite troops, which make such moves quite possible.

At this stage of describing possibilities and assumptions, a possibility, that can turn out to be very unpleasant firstly to Asians, has to be considered, i.e., Soviet-Sino prochement. Will the Soviets develop sufficient diplomatic or political foresight as to organize a prochement with China and proceed to build a coalition group of the major Asian communist nations? This possibility may take the following form and sequence.

- a. The granting of some territorial concessions/the withdrawal of some territorial claims by the two powers respectively in order to stabilize national boundaries and neutralize existing problems.

b. A reduction of leadership ambitions and an understanding to share leadership responsibility collectively. This could be extended to Vietnam and North Korea to cater to their individualism.

c. Resulting from a and b nonaggression pacts, which will especially be attractive to Soviet Russia and China as the reduction in troop strength means in the immediate reduction on military expenditure, an increase in funds essential to both countries.

d. Soviet technical assistance to weaken the dependency on the west for technical assistance.

The mind is reluctant to examine an unpleasant possibility which can have far-reaching results and is tempted to dismiss an unpleasant theory by a pleasant answer "the Soviets and the Chinese will never come together and there are too many regional rivalries." However, if communist expansion becomes retarded and increasingly so in the area by the development of Asian Democratic States, then leadership aims may be lowered and regional rivalries held in abeyance in order to safeguard an endangered objective held in common by all--the expansion of communism.

It is now appropriate at this stage to give a description of the rest of the relevant Asian countries. They are the non-aligned countries, who may provide the answer to the threat, as they have developed or have some form of foundation organization.

Asean. The countries of Asean, Thailand--Malaysia--Singapore--Indonesia and the Philippines. These countries are democracies possessing the factors described earlier. They have banded together for economical and technical coordination but also in "pursuit of stability and security from external interference." Here are countries who are a direct obstacle to Communist military expansion and Communist influence. However their regional differ-

ences and economic conditions are such that they present individually or collectively a very weak defense, militarily. Apart from building up and coordinating the military capability of these countries, the main effort should be to maintain the confidence of the people in the Democratic form of government and their determination to maintain their way of life. This is the center of gravity that would be and is being threatened. It is this center of gravity that should be safeguarded, because either confidence or lack of confidence of the people will be reflected directly through the Democratic system on the government, and will naturally influence political decisions and strategy of each government. The deliberate systematic corroding of confidence, through developing chaotic conditions may take many years. It is this factor of prolonged time for deterioration that gives the impression that it is not possible and cannot take effect. It is however possible and real.

What would be the main factors that would lay a foundation to maintain the confidence of the people and maintain their attitudes to preserve their way of life.

- a. US military presence in the area.
- b. Credibility in US willingness to assist during a military crisis if called upon to do so.
- c. The building up and maintenance of economic stability. This last factor can be considered as extremely important and also the most difficult, because of a number of factors. These factors are inherent and may differ in each country and will not be described in this paragraph, but they have to be studied and overcome if economic stability is to be achieved. Economic stability in turn reduces all other obstacles such as racial tension. Without this factor a and b lose their vitality.

d. The understanding of nonalignment. Nonalignment carries with it a stigma to the mind that expects every state to be on one side of the fence or the other. The common question is how can any country who does not join the western group of democracies call themselves pro-democratic? This is a question arising from a position of unawareness of the attitudes of a Third World Asian country. The factors contributing to the desire for a policy of nonalignment originates in the historical background and environment described earlier. Countries dependent on foreign sources for vital factors for their economy and security do not want to be dependent on any one source. The policy of nonalignment is an expression of individuality by nations who are not sufficiently dependent to be aligned. The nonaligned countries form a middle force that may well stand in between, cushion and prevent two extreme groups from open conflict. Nonaligned democratic states are those who have rejected a change in their way of life and whose doors therefore can never be closed to other democratic states. A communist country, however, if communism is to be practiced absolutely, cannot be nonaligned because, they will be bound to support the objective of communist expansion. If they shed support to the objective of world communism, then they lean towards or become socialist as opposed to communism and for such countries nonalignment is possible.

India

India has been and is a sub-continent that wields a tremendous psychological influence on the neighboring countries of Asia. In spite of grave social and political problems, with large parts of the country in dire economical distress and with one state government gone Communist, India still remains a Democratic state, keeping out Communism in spite of internal economical conditions, conducive to the acceptance of Communism. This

has a deep influence on the neighboring states. The main reason is the way of life factor described, coupled with the political reason that India, because of her traditional position of influence will resist any other influence from competing in the region. India apart from her strategic position becomes extremely important in that she forms the nucleus or pivot to form a group of nations similar to Asean. India quite sensitive and anxious about Communist expansion through Campuchea, Laos and Burma on the East and Afghanistan on her Northern border will react willingly except that now she depends on the Soviet Union, especially for technological assistance. This is coupled with her differences with Pakistan. Here in this area there is at present the scope and the correct environment for the US to take the initiative and forge an alliance of a group of countries, commencing with India and Pakistan. It will be an alliance that will have a balancing partner in the Asean group of countries.

United States Past, Current and Suggested Strategies

In examining or specially planning out strategies, the advantages and disadvantages of rival strategies should always be borne in mind in order to counter or exploit respectively such advantages or disadvantages. Briefly, therefore, Soviet strategy advantages and disadvantages are listed below.

Advantages

a. They have developed a military capability in the Third World itself in the form of satellite armies of vast numbers. The governments of these countries are sufficiently motivated by internal factors as well as by overall Communist ideology to be eager for offensive action. The armies themselves are suited for, if necessary, protracted war in Asian terrain

and conditions. There is, therefore, a vast reservoir of expendable manpower available.

b. In some countries economic instability plus internal political and social differences make that society conducive for deterioration and influence. Disruption of a system, specially an economical one is very much easier and quicker than the attempt to build one up.

c. Perseverance and patience are their main advantages. The steady build-up of local cadres to be used as tools of disruption can take years. It is accepted that insurgencies will go on for years.

d. The democratic countries of the Third World stand separately by themselves. There has been no attempt to coordinate their capabilities for a united stand against Communist expansionism. Therefore, today they can be influenced and concentrated upon separately.

Disadvantages

a. The main and outstanding disadvantage is that the main Communist objective is the establishment of Communist states which means a change in the way of life. The strategy has to depend so far on military intervention or through internal disruptions. Both methods, the attempts of which have created fears and doubts over the years, retards any attempts to establish or promote association or links with the Soviet or other Communist power. The presence of local Communist parties, with their loyalties to Moscow or Peking increases these doubts.

b. The inadequacies of Communist economic ideology is being gradually proved by time and experience. Internally the socialist form of economic management has been tried and failed. Internally Third World countries such as South Korea have shown marked improvement in their economies as

against their Communist neighbors whose economies have either deteriorated or remained stagnant.

c. Many Third World countries in Asia have developed their economies to a state where the compulsory marshalling of all and maximum factors of production is no longer necessary. This marshalling is normally done through a military or Communist type of dictatorship. The state of the economy is sufficiently stable to prevent the adoption of the above mentioned drastic methods.

d. The Soviets have insufficient economic capability to compete with the West in large scale assistance.

It will now be appropriate to consider US foreign policy against the background of the information outlined in the preceding paragraphs.

The main trend in military strategy for the area, immediately after World War II appeared to be military containment to prevent the expansion of Communism through the use of mainly military means. Containment was effected by the presence of military capability, the strengthening of the military capability of friendly allied nations through assistance and joint effort made possible by agreements or alliances. Military containment policy was a straightforward arrangement to the straightforward problem of military aggression. This strategy sought to prevent the Asian nations, divided and weak, from succumbing one by one to military force. There is no doubt that events have proved that these arrangements have in some instances stopped military aggression and in others prevented and will in the future as well prevent the use of force for military expansion. Has the threat of Communist expansionism therefore been successfully contained? The answer is, no. Slowed down or retarded but not contained. As indicated in this essay, communist strategy has acknowledged the reality of this military containment capability of the US together with Asian democratic

states and attempts to counter it by a strategy of mainly two thrusts coordinated and supporting each other to pursue the objective of communist expansionism. The current, communist strategies in Asia can therefore be aligned behind as providing these two thrusts.

Neutralize or thwart the use of joint US and allied military capability by denying the circumstances for direct use of US military capability.

Pursue a pattern of different forms of influence and threats to coerce Asian nations separately and one by one to reject US presence. The actual effect and implementation may take the form or pattern of the Domino Theory. Therefore, if South Asia is considered as being increasingly important to western powers economically and strategically, then the gradual country by country denial of economic and strategic facilities can be an alarming possibility. US strategy therefore, has to take two forms, a military capability and one that will prevent denial and replace it with acceptance of US and western alliances.

Military Capability

The strategy of military capability takes priority over others. It forms the foundation upon which depends the progress and strength of other strategies because these other strategies depend for their progress and strength upon the confidence and reliance the Asian countries place upon the US i.e. the image of the US. The US military presence and the confidence in the willingness to use military capability is the main prop of this image. The military presence or image of the US received a setback in Vietnam. This experience, the Vietnam War demonstrated, that an Asian army with logistic support from foreign powers can contain or neutralize the military capability of a super power in a limited war. As this method of

using an Asian army is only used by the Communist powers, it was a setback for western military capability. However, this very same method can be developed to meet and contain the Asian Communist armies. The method is the development and coordination of the armies of the democratic countries. Today there is no common coordinating authority and on their own each of these countries respectively lack the means and the image sufficient to have any practical influence on the others. The difficulty is not the convincing of these nations that there is a common threat. They realize it, but the difficulty is to convince them that they must face the threat before it arrives on their borders. That it is a combined effort that is necessary because the aim of the threat is their lack of cohesion and organization. The requirement is a NATO type of organization for a concerted defense. The problems facing those attempting this will be many including obstruction and lack of self-confidence from the respective Asian governments themselves, a condition of inertia developed by the enormity of many deficiencies, economic, technical and otherwise weighed against the tasks to be faced. They being on the defensive, further lack the driving motivation of the attacker. These countries, however, have many assets that a patient and persevering team can weld together. They possess the same abundant manpower, and if they combine, they can dissipate amongst all members the economic burden of maintaining a combined force. The organization of a strong Asian army brings about the same advantage that the Soviets now possess. An Asian military capability without the requirement to commit US ground troops i.e., the ability to project US military capability through an Asian military force--the sharing of the economic requirement and above all the formal collective responsibility for military operations being taken by the Asian governments.

Whilst it is emphasized that a US military presence in the form of a strong naval force--air strike capability and the presence of ground troops in friendly countries is essential to build confidence, it would not be out of place to summarize the dangers of committing ground troops. I have taken as an example Korea, as the question can arise, what is the position of the US if South Korea, with or without provocation by North Korea decides to advance into North Korea with the intention of unifying Korea? The suggested policy should be that it should be made quite clear to South Korea that a unifying attempt is entirely at her own risk without any military assistance from the US. The US being committed only to safeguard South Korean sovereignty. The following factors are relevant.

a. North Korea is now recognized as a sovereign state and military occupation of North Korea will be considered an act of aggression by many countries and the Soviets will be pleased if US ground troops are committed. Such a commitment will therefore do considerable damage to the image of the US, and contributory to this is that psychologically Asian countries will always condemn the presence of combatant foreign troops in an Asian country, which is the reaction to the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

b. The North Korean army is too strong, and the South Korean army even with US assistance cannot complete a short war. A protracted war with US ground troops may therefore turn out to be another protracted war as in Vietnam, again running the risk of straining the national will of the US. A second withdrawal from an Asian ground war will be disastrous to the image of the US. Therefore, whilst there can be no withdrawal once committed it must not be forgotten that neither the USSR or China, whatever their differences may be, will never allow the Communist state of North Korea to be overcome by a democratic country specially one supported by the US.

c. Such a war will be immediately used as the reason for the stagnation or deterioration of the North Korean economy and will thus prevent the Asian countries from observing the failure of the economic structure of a Communist state.

Influence Other Than Through Military Capability

Acceptance of the US depends upon and goes beyond the US military presence, though this is the main factor. Military capability as the main and only factor is no longer valid. The waning influence of military capability has not been recognized. There has not been the desired amount of importance paid to the systematic building up of the US image, so vital because of the rising importance of other factors. Even in maintaining the US military presence, more weight is apparently given to internal factors, of the US such as the dollar cost rather than the adverse effect of even a partial withdrawal would have on the confidence of Asian governments. A lowering of confidence will prevent or at least reduce any form of coordinated effort in other spheres. Confidence in US military capability and willingness to use it is the lubricant for all other strategies to be implemented.

Confidence in the US and internal economic stability are the basics in preparing against disruptions. Both the US and Asian governments should mutually recognize the realities of international interdependence.

Development can only take place if the regional, political, economical, social and environmental problems are at least contained, for which extraordinary cooperation specially amongst all South Asian regional nations is essential. Patient seeking of solutions to problems in order to increase rate of growth, slow down inflation and others that would make the economic system less vulnerable to disruption. Bilateral and multilateral

approaches and the careful studying and understanding the society and attitudes of every country is vital. The assuming of a particular reaction, impatience and underestimation has no place and to say the least, is unwise. Examples are described subsequently.

A superpower must recognize that no self-respecting country likes either threats or assistance given with a dominating attitude. As described earlier, Asian countries sensitive to their past colonial period and now politically mature do not accept either this type of assistance or threats if they can possibly help it. If circumstances compel them to accept, it has adverse effects on goodwill rather than improve it. To a country that offers that type of assistance, the lack of goodwill at the end is a surprise. To the Asian mind it is not surprising but a natural result as every Asian country without exception has regained an individuality. The US should attempt to win and retain the confidence of these nations and be very sensitive to the gradual build-up of goodwill. Two examples can be cited now of assumed reaction, the ignoring or underestimation of local factors of these two respective countries involved. The two examples are of a large country--India and a small one--Sri Lanka.

a. All gas stations in Sri Lanka were owned by private foreign firms. Daily turnover of profit was channelled into foreign firms. Gas a vital commodity controlling or influencing every sphere of domestic and industrial activity was in the hands of foreign firms and the increase of the island's foreign exchange earnings through development of fueling facilities for foreign ships depended on the cooperation of these foreign firms. The Sri Lanka government therefore nationalized foreign gas companies and the US retaliated by stopping aid as there was provision in the US to do so. Apparently no other factor was considered. Did the US expect Sri

Lanka to continue to depend on foreign firms where such vital factors for the control and development of the Sri Lankan economy were involved? Sri Lanka continued without assistance at a time when assistance was urgently required for development. The adverse effects this decision had on goodwill even without propaganda (of which there was plenty) is obvious.

b. Relations with India became strained when India continued with her nuclear programme. Could India be possibly expected to cease her nuclear programme especially when another Asian power, China, who had attacked India in 1964, already possessed a nuclear capability? India took the obvious action, turned to the Soviet Union who was not slow in extending their influence. Total influence has been prevented by the factors and reasons described earlier, factors and reasons that would always make an Asian democratic state to contain influence by a Communist state. Added to these reasons, the inherent disadvantages of Communist strategy described earlier, and highlighted by the events in Afghanistan, India remains willing to develop friendship with the US. The lesson here is that all these factors helping to contain Communist influence in India, are not by the effort or contribution of US policy. In fact the assumed reaction of expecting India to react favorably to a threat was wrong and the resultant strategy decision to stop aid closed all avenues of negotiation and influence and opened the doors for communist influence.

Today as far as Asia is concerned, economic policy, humanitarian assistance, military assistance all without exception are linked to and influence internal political policy, through the attitudes that are created, attitudes of a society that influence political decisions or even change governments through the democratic systems. It would be a mistake to isolate economic assistance and implement such assistance in isolated events and packets, as and when problems arise without planning out an

economic assistance strategy for each country, bearing in mind that the economic benefits to be derived from such assistance or economic benefits to be gathered by the recipient country both should have a favorable effect politically to both countries.

An Economic Strategy

There may be a US economic strategy, but so far there is no distinct clear US economic strategy on which a Third World country can plan or construct its own strategy with the US. The existence of such a strategy, clearly laying down the principles and conditions on which economic aid is available opens avenues for negotiation and makes possible the bonds of influence. In forming and consolidating such a strategy two realities must be remembered.

a. The US expects a return in the form of goodwill and a development in the economy of the recipient country. Both factors will result in mutual cooperation.

b. The possible presence of inefficiency, lack of technical knowledge and corruption.

The returns on paragraph a depends entirely on the controlling of paragraph b. Today paragraph b ensures that paragraph a will never or often only partially come into effect and millions of dollars are wasted. How can economic assistance be supervised? "It means interference in the internal affairs of that country!" This is the normal argument that is put forward. It is an impressive but an entirely theoretical one. Economic assistance to a Third World country is a mutual political and/or economic investment to both countries. It is on this foundation that assistance should be agreed upon at the commencement. For example, in a construction project, once the project itself is agreed upon as feasible as well as

useful the conditions should be a mutual awareness of the progress of every stage and use of funds according to schedule, though control itself can be maintained by the recipient country. A check on funds at every stage with a condition for withdrawal on misuse or inefficiency is essential. It has been proven by experience that whilst a successful project achieves its purpose and erases and justifies the disagreements or friction caused on the way, the unsuccessful project not only is a wastage of dollars but in fact creates adverse feelings. Very often this is allowed to happen, because of the reluctance to establish conditions of awareness and control of funds. Control of funds enhances, whilst lack of control decreases psychologically the value of a project. Value which is translated into goodwill. The US in contrast to the Soviets can compete effectively along this non-military dimension--economic aid. I have to comment now on a question that is frequently heard, regarding the granting of economic aid to Third World countries. Will Third World economies, developed by US aid, mean reducing sources of raw material, decreasing market for finished products of the US and in fact mean increasingly by adverse effects on US industries and economy? The gradual progress of the world into a free competing international market cannot be stopped as every nation strives for industrial development. Competition amongst nations is gradually increasing as more nations become more advanced in technology. The advancement of Third World countries in technology and availability of technology and assistance from other western advanced nations have brought about the position that though the US still leads in these aspects, the US is neither the only source nor holds the monopoly as:

1. The source of sophisticated machinery.
2. Development of advanced industrial technology.

3. The only source of loans.

The inevitability of this process, this changing economic situation, and the interdependence of the US economy with the economies of other countries must be considered when formulating economic strategy.

Other Influences

I have not described in detail other strategies and attitudes that have an effect on US influence and image.

a. Strategies of influence need not be limited for effect entirely to economical effort. Communication with other societies can be effected through the presence and activity of US personnel along the aspects of cultural, sport and humanitarian work. Such organizations do exist but neither coordinated nor constant effort is maintained to have any visible impact. Two factors are pointed out:

1. Such effort can over a period of time build-up a very favorable image through constant association with the local people.

2. Effort on these aspects should never cease because a particular country, decides to obtain aid from a Communist country or indicate leanings towards Communism. In fact these should be the very reasons that effort and association should be intensified.

b. An attitude of expecting a Third World nation to agree on all aspects of US foreign policy is not practical. The differences in political and social environments of the Third World countries makes agreement impossible on all issues of international politics. For example, a Third World country should not be expected to agree to a US support of South Africa. Some governments will recognize the vital strategic importance of South Africa and the necessity to safeguard this, whilst gradually persuading the South African government to change the Apartheid policies, but

very few or none will acknowledge this officially. Criticism therefore on such an issue should be expected and not interpreted as anti-US but as criticism on one particular aspect of US policy.

South Africa and Israel

US policy for South Africa and Israel, though it has no direct bearing on South Asia, is being commented on in this essay because the effect it has on the US image can be considerable specially as the issues involved provides wide propaganda value against the US. It will be sufficient to forward two possible future situations to focus analysis on these lines.

a. Today the neighboring African states are weak and are dependent on the South African economy for existence. These conditions prevent these states from taking any positive action on behalf of the black majority of South Africa. The Soviets can take the following action in stages on South Africa. Organize the gradual reduction of economic dependence of these neighboring states--increase and effectively train their military capability--commence military action using the combined manpower of these African states and Cuban troops to actively support an insurgency. Over a few years, this insurgency will take a Communist form politically with the Soviets getting the credit from the Third World for assisting in the overthrow of an oppressive government.

b. In the Middle East the US has gained considerable credit on the efforts to give the Palistinians a state. If because of the delay in negotiation, the defacto occupation of the West Bank by Israel settlements finally denies the Palistinians a state and thereby a solution, the effect on the US image can be very adverse. This pattern of events, can have a very adverse cumulative effect on the US image in the eyes of the Third World.

The US can no longer, without having adverse effects afford to analyze and formulate its policy and strategy for South Asia entirely from the US angle of view. Careful analysis has to be made to the changes in Soviet strategy and to acknowledge the reality of factors inherent to the respective Asian nations. Strategies may have to differ in some aspects to suit a particular nation or area but all have to be coordinated into a distinct pattern recognized by South Asian nations as to convince them of its mutual benefit for security and economic development.

The requirement for flexibility, described above, flexibility to changes of Soviet strategy, changing conditions of the area etc., must be tied into perserverance and patience in pursuing a decided strategy. Neither the many problems, nor some disagreeable action by an Asian nation should result in a temporary lessening of effort.

The Threat can be of a creeping slow accumulation like cancer and may not be a tangible sudden blow like Pearl Harbor and therefore the containment strategies as described above has to be the slow countering by influence against influence.

The aspects of Soviet strategy for South Asia in particular and as an Asian viewpoint were described together with possible methods of countering them. Both categories being dispersed amongst the preceding paragraphs, they will be regrouped and summarized as a conclusion to this essay.

Soviet Strategy

Soviet strategy continues the objectives of communist expansion in the Third World. Flexibility in strategy by recognizing the current factors in South Asia, and that the direct military control as for Warsaw Pact Satellite countries is not possible. Mainly the recognition of the individualism of Asian communist states and with the possibility of catering to

this by a reapproachment with China and the organization of a coalition of the leading Asian communist nations. Perseverance and patience in pursuing the objective in that initially the attempt will be to deny strategic facilities and curtail the different avenues of communication between US and Asian countries, before achieving the final phase of establishing communist or pro-communist governments. Increasing Soviet influence gradually and the use of pressure through the presence of Asian communist military capability, especially in large numbers of trained manpower.

United States

Suggested possibilities considered best to meet Soviet influence and pressure are as follows. Recognize the Soviet strategy pattern itself in that military capability alone is insufficient and that communist influence has to be contained with or by western influence in addition to military capability. Awareness of the developed political maturity and Individuality of Asian nations and also analysis of vital factors of Asian society. Factors most of which can make the spreading of communist influence an uphill task whilst the US has far more advantages in these factors enabling the coordination of these nations into groups or alliances of pro-western democracies.

The establishment of a strong military presence and most important to build up an assurance and confidence amongst Asian states that the US is willing and can use this military capability. This is the basic or foundation to build confidence upon which other strategies can be implemented.

The build-up of economic stability. Economic instability is fertile ground on which other forms of instability, such as racial differences, rapidly grow. These are the main avenues for communist influence. The aim

of establishing economic stability is the balancing factor for the military presence factor and without one or the other of them Asian states one by one will be open to erosion. It is therefore essential to establish a long-term economic aid plan for each country bearing the following factors. Constant and persevering patient effort and not aid in temporary packets. Aid to implement a particular aspect of the main plan instead of throwing across a sum of money just because an Asian government has asked for it. Supervision of the use of aid without interference in a countries internal plan. Awareness that friction, disagreement may be caused by this supervision, but that supervision is essential for completion of a project. Whilst lack of it results in wastage and misuse of funds, with all its attendant disadvantages, i.e., the project is not completed, more funds are called for, and in fact unless supervised these funds cause more instability and disturbance in the economic balance of that country. The above factors have to be considered to prevent economic aid from defeating its own purpose, that of promoting economic stability.

Strategy of Coordination. Apart from the US Naval and air strike capability, US military presence can be positively projected through Asian military resources, i.e., Asian combatant troops. The development of the armies of democratic states, a continuous effort to coordinate these armies into cohesive alliances, allied to meet a common threat is essential to meet the vast manpower of the battle-experienced armies of the leading Asian communist states. Emphasis is made on this effort because, the use of US combatant ground troops themselves in Asia has many political and economical disadvantages, whilst this coordinating effort can be an effective US influence in the region of South Asia.

A completion of US coordination and assistance would be the formation of groups of the larger Asian democracies, the three main groups being--

India and Pakistan--Asean countries--Japan and South Korea--who separately in their areas and jointly for the region could agree on joint military effort if a threat materializes and can also maintain economic communication for regional stability. The realization and the expectation of a combined reaction by many Asian states against the interference against any one of them can be a psychological deterrence equal to or even more forceful than a military presence.

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